COP30 Raised the Ceiling — But Africa Is Still Locked Out of Climate Finance

By Richard Ndebele

COP30 has ended in Belém, Brazil, and the official narrative is already taking shape: historic
ambition, a new roadmap, and a renewed promise to scale climate finance for developing
countries. The summit’s most visible outcome is the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap, a plan to
mobilise at least US$1.3 trillion per year by 2035 for climate action in poorer countries. In
parallel, the final COP30 package endorsed a political commitment to triple adaptation
finance by 2035, while reiterating support for loss-and-damage mechanisms and just-
transition tools.

These are not trivial declarations. They raise the ceiling on what the world is prepared to say
about financing climate action. But for Africa, the question is no longer about ceilings. It is
about doors. A higher ambition line is useful only if the continent can access capital fast,
affordably, and at scale. Today, Africa remains structurally locked out of the climate-finance
house — and that gap is now a macroeconomic and investment risk.

The continent’s financing needs are well-established. To implement Africa’s Nationally
Determined Contributions by 2030, estimates show that African countries require around
US$2.5–2.8 trillion between 2020 and 2030, roughly US$250–277 billion per year. Yet actual
annual climate-finance flows into Africa have been only about US$30–44 billion, around
12% of what is required. In global terms, Africa still receives only around 2% of total
climate-finance flows.

This mismatch is not an academic inconvenience. It translates into rising fiscal stress, weaker
productivity, and a slower investment climate. Without predictable adaptation and transition
finance, African states are forced into a costly cycle: spend on emergency response after
disasters, repair infrastructure under crisis conditions, and borrow to plug gaps in systems
that should have been strengthened beforehand. The result is a hidden “climate premium” on
African development — higher capital costs for governments, businesses, and households,
and a drag on competitiveness.

A second, equally important constraint is the limited role of private finance. Private capital
still accounts for only a small share of total climate finance in Sub-Saharan Africa, far lower
than in other regions. When private participation stays that low, the burden falls back onto
public budgets and concessional windows — precisely the channels Africa has struggled to
access and scale.

So why does Africa remain locked out even as COP30 raises ambition? The core problem is
that global climate finance is still governed by narrow, highly gated access rules. Approval
processes are complex and expensive to navigate. Funding facilities often demand co-
financing shares that overstretched treasuries and municipalities cannot provide without new
debt. Disbursement timelines stretch across months and years — a mismatch for shocks that
arrive within days. Adaptation projects, which are vital for survival, are treated as less
“bankable” because they do not generate rapid commercial returns.

The consequence is clear: adaptation financing needs in developing countries are now many
times larger than current flows, and the gap is threatening lives, livelihoods, and economies.

Put plainly, Africa is asked to meet gold-standard compliance requirements for finance that is
slow, conditioned, and insufficient relative to the liabilities it is meant to hedge.

Zimbabwe provides a clear micro-illustration. In Bulawayo, chronic water insecurity is not
merely a municipal headache; it is a productivity shock. It affects manufacturing continuity,
property values, service delivery, and household welfare. Yet large-scale climate-resilient
water investment remains under-funded. The financing gap shows up in a quiet but costly
way: resilience becomes a private tax. Households and small enterprises drill boreholes, buy
solar pumps, and install irrigation systems with their own savings. Farmers are told to
“adapt,” but must fund drip lines, storage, energy, and climate-smart inputs in markets where
capital is expensive and credit is thin. This is the same story across Africa — adaptation is
real, but its financing is pushed downward to those least able to carry it.

For Business Times readers, the implication is straightforward: climate finance access is now
a determinant of Africa’s investment climate. It shapes sovereign risk, infrastructure viability,
agribusiness competitiveness, industrial stability, and the cost of doing business in climate-
exposed cities and regions. The post-COP era is no longer about pledges. It is about whether
the financing system can deliver resilience at the speed of risk.

What needs to change after Belém?

First, global climate-finance architecture must treat access as a development imperative, not
an administrative privilege. If the world is serious about mobilising US$1.3 trillion a year,
approval pathways need simplification, disbursement timelines need shortening, and
adaptation funding must shift toward larger grant-based components for high-vulnerability,
debt-exposed countries. A roadmap without usable instruments will remain a headline
without a delivery engine.

Second, African states must strengthen their own readiness and integrity systems. This
includes building credible project pipelines, improving data and monitoring capacity, and
tightening public financial management so funds can be absorbed cleanly and executed
efficiently. Better governance reduces risk premia and makes blended finance structures more
credible to the private sector.

Third, Africa must mobilise more of its own capital pools to crowd in private investment. The
continent is sitting on significant state-managed assets and growing domestic markets.
Redirecting even a modest share into properly structured climate vehicles — tied to water
security, renewables, resilient agriculture, transport, and urban adaptation — could unlock
larger private participation. Climate resilience cannot remain a donor-dependent
conversation; it must become a bankable development pipeline.

COP30 did not fail. But it did not unlock Africa either. It raised ambition while leaving the
access problem largely intact. For the continent, the most important work now happens
outside conference halls: widening the doorway, building domestic readiness, and making
resilience investable. Until that happens, climate finance will keep growing on paper while
Africa keeps paying in reality — through higher fiscal stress, weaker productivity, and rising
private adaptation costs.

In short: a higher ceiling is welcome. But Africa needs the keys to the door.

About the Author:
Richard Ndebele is Manager: Technical, Research & Quality Assurance at the Chartered
Governance and Accountancy Institute in Zimbabwe (CGI Zimbabwe) and Country
Champion for the PAFA Sustainability Centre of Excellence. He writes on governance,
sustainability, and public financial management in Africa.
Contact: rndebele@cgizim.org